// HALBORN

Smart Contract Security Audit

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Stader Labs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their MaticX smart contracts beginning on April 3rd, 2022 and ending on April 5th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided in the GitHub repository stader-labs/maticX.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were mostly addressed by Stader Labs team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph)
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hot-spots or bugs. (MythX)
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither)
- Testnet deployment (Brownie, Remix IDE)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
10 - CRITICAL				
9 - 8 - HIGH 7 - 6 - MEDIUM				
5 - 4 - LOW 3 - 1 - VERY LO	OW AND INFORMA	TIONAL		

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:

- MaticX.sol
- ValidatorRegistry.sol
- FxStateChildTunnel.sol
- FxStateRootTunnel.sol
- RateProvider.sol

Commit ID 1:

- eb9f87e2ac124d999b4066a6aada78b71cf701c8

Commit ID 2:

- 8f914608ae40fdb35cfae281ff6c1dda9943b632

Commit ID 3:

- 5ac965782854874d7530203225167b230d893bce

Fixed Commit ID:

- 0c612d147cb11268d168bd4e6eac1ba6608025b4

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	2	0	4

LIKELIHOOD

	(HAL-01) (HAL-02)		
-			
	(HAL-03) (HAL-04) (HAL-05) (HAL-06)		

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 – POSSIBLE DENIAL OF SERVICE IN FXSTATECHILDTUNNEL.GETRATE FUNCTION	Medium	SOLVED - 04/28/2022
HAL02 - MISSING REQUIRE STATEMENT IN SETFEEPERCENT	Medium	SOLVED - 04/13/2022
HAL03 - UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL04 - USING ++I CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN I++ IN LOOPS	Informational	SOLVED - 04/13/2022
HAL05 – PROPOSEDMANAGER STATE VARIABLE CAN BE REMOVED	Informational	SOLVED - 04/13/2022
HALØ6 – BOOLEAN EQUALITIES	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

3.1 (HAL-01) POSSIBLE DENIAL OF SERVICE IN FXSTATECHILDTUNNEL.GETRATE FUNCTION - MEDIUM

Description:

In the MaticX contract, in the requestWithdraw() function, the following
call to IFxStateRootTunnel(fxStateRootTunnel).sendMessageToChild() is
done:

Listing 1: MaticX.sol (Lines 287-292)

```
225 function requestWithdraw(uint256 _amount) external override
       require(_amount > 0, "Invalid amount");
           uint256 totalShares,
           uint256 totalPooledMatic
       ) = convertMaticXToMatic(_amount);
       _burn(msg.sender, _amount);
       uint256 leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic =
↓ totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic;
       uint256 totalDelegated = getTotalStakeAcrossAllValidators();
       require(
           "Too much to withdraw"
       );
       uint256[] memory validators = IValidatorRegistry(
↓ validatorRegistry)
           .getValidators();
       uint256 preferredValidatorId = IValidatorRegistry(
↓ validatorRegistry)
           .preferredWithdrawalValidatorId();
```

```
uint256 currentIdx = 0;
      for (; currentIdx < validators.length; ++currentIdx) {</pre>
          if (preferredValidatorId == validators[currentIdx]) break;
      }
      while (leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic > 0) {
          uint256 validatorId = validators[currentIdx];
          address validatorShare = IStakeManager(stakeManager)
               .getValidatorContract(validatorId);
          (uint256 validatorBalance, ) = getTotalStake(
               IValidatorShare(validatorShare)
          );
          uint256 amount2WithdrawFromValidator = (validatorBalance
               leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic)
               ? validatorBalance
               : leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic;
          IValidatorShare(validatorShare).sellVoucher_new(
               type(uint256).max
          );
          userWithdrawalRequests[msg.sender].push(
               WithdrawalRequest(
                   IValidatorShare(validatorShare).unbondNonces(
\vdash address(this)),
                   IStakeManager(stakeManager).epoch() +
                       IStakeManager(stakeManager).withdrawalDelay(),
          );
          leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic -= amount2WithdrawFromValidator
          currentIdx = currentIdx + 1 < validators.length</pre>
               : 0;
      IFxStateRootTunnel(fxStateRootTunnel).sendMessageToChild(
          abi.encode(
```

```
289 totalShares - _amount,
290 totalPooledMatic - totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic
291 )
292 );
293
294 emit RequestWithdraw(msg.sender, _amount,
        totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic);
295 }
```

In case totalShares - _amount equals to 0, any calls to the FxStateChildTunnel.getRate() function would revert as the function would try to perform a division by 0:

```
Listing 2: MaticX.sol (Line 53)

42 function getReserves() public view returns (uint256, uint256) {
43  (uint256 maticX, uint256 MATIC) = abi.decode(
44      latestData,
45      (uint256, uint256)
46  );
47
48  return (maticX, MATIC);
49 }
50
51 function getRate() external view returns (uint256) {
52  (uint256 maticX, uint256 matic) = getReserves();
53  return (matic * 1 ether) / maticX;
54 }
```

This would cause a Denial of Service on all functions that use the getRate() function.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 5 Recommendation:

It is recommended to call the convertMaticToMaticX() function before the sendMessageToChild() call. convertMaticToMaticX() now correctly handles the edge case where MaticX's totalSupply or totalPooledMatic is 0. For example:

```
Listing 3: MaticX.sol (Lines 287-296)
```

```
225 function requestWithdraw(uint256 _amount) external override
↓ whenNotPaused {
       require(_amount > 0, "Invalid amount");
           uint256 totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic,
           uint256 totalShares,
           uint256 totalPooledMatic
       ) = convertMaticXToMatic(_amount);
       _burn(msg.sender, _amount);
       uint256 leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic =
       uint256 totalDelegated = getTotalStakeAcrossAllValidators();
       require(
           totalDelegated >= totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic.
           "Too much to withdraw"
       );
       uint256[] memory validators = IValidatorRegistry(
↓ validatorRegistry)
           .getValidators();
       uint256 preferredValidatorId = IValidatorRegistry(
↓ validatorRegistry)
           .preferredWithdrawalValidatorId();
       uint256 currentIdx = 0;
       for (; currentIdx < validators.length; ++currentIdx) {</pre>
           if (preferredValidatorId == validators[currentIdx]) break;
       while (leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic > 0) {
           uint256 validatorId = validators[currentIdx];
```

256	address validatorShare = IStakeManager(stakeManager)
257	.getValidatorContract(validatorId);
258	(uint256 validatorBalance,) = getTotalStake(
259	IValidatorShare(validatorShare)
260);
261	
262	<pre>uint256 amount2WithdrawFromValidator = (validatorBalance</pre>
L,	<=
263	leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic)
264	? validatorBalance
265	: leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic;
266	
267	IValidatorShare(validatorShare).sellVoucher_new(
268	amount2WithdrawFromValidator
269	type(uint256).max
270);
271	
272	<pre>userWithdrawalRequests[msg.sender].push(</pre>
273	WithdrawalRequest(
274	IValidatorShare(validatorShare).unbondNonces(
L,	address(this)),
275	IStakeManager(stakeManager).epoch() +
276	IStakeManager(stakeManager).withdrawalDelay(),
277	validatorShare
278)
279);
280	
281	leftAmount2WithdrawInMatic -= amount2WithdrawFromValidator
L,	;
282	currentIdx = currentIdx + 1 < validators.length
283	? currentIdx + 1
284	: 0;
285	}
286	
287	(
288	uint256 totalAmount2WithdrawInMatic,
289	uint256 totalSharesFinal,
290	uint256 totalPooledMaticFinal
291) = convertMaticXToMatic(_amount);
292	IFxStateRootTunnel(fxStateRootTunnel).sendMessageToChild(
293	abi.encode(
294	
295	
296)

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Stader Labs team fixed the issue. The FxStateChildTunnel. getRate() function now makes use of the convertMaticXToMatic() function in the FxStateChildTunnel contract that handles the edge case where Matic or MaticX is equal to 0.

3.2 (HAL-02) MISSING REQUIRE STATEMENT IN SETFEEPERCENT - MEDIUM

Description:

In the MaticX contract, the function setFeePercent() is missing a require statement that restricts the feePercent setting to a value greater than 100. Setting feePercent to a value higher than 100 would cause users to not they could for rewards, as it would be impossible to re-stake any validator with rewards:

```
Calling -> contract_MaticX.setFeePercent(255, {'from': manager))
Transaction sent: 0xd182bee1919918c2b5c9798c65ac4def83flc3cdcf53ddef25fe66db242b27bb
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: S
MaticX.setFeePercent confirmed Block: 14526566 Gas used: 28461 (0.00%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.restakeAll({'from': user2})
Transaction sent: 0xd53838529d31401c13b8dc8bf52a224790b2a77191ff4f35d976a00edb0d90
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 3
MaticX.restakeAll confirmed (ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance) Block: 14526567 Gas used: 75493 (0.01%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.setFeePercent(101, {'from': manager))
Transaction sent: 0x8129770a8F4bf34f4d00d2d2df93278f021e77199c6b830896633e94b7f369e0
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 6
MaticX.setFeePercent confirmed Block: 14526566 Gas used: 28461 (0.00%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.restakeAll(('from': user2))
Transaction sent: 0x72c71f2dcb0c644b9f5397afa95753de969934de61496504b41afbda90b01b55
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 4
MaticX.restakeAll confirmed (ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance) Block: 14526569 Gas used: 105188 (0.02%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.setFeePercent(100, {'from': manager))
Transaction sent: 0x72c71f2dcb0c64b9f5397afa95753de969934de61496504b41afbda90b01b55
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 4
MaticX.restakeAll confirmed (ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance) Block: 14526569 Gas used: 105188 (0.02%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.setFeePercent(100, {'from': manager))
Transaction sent: 0xfecbddfc28f38132c42a96f359a47b50tae26f3177c19a88c6c5adbce91e9
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 7
MaticX.setFeePercent confirmed Block: 14526570 Gas used: 28461 (0.00%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.restakeAll({'from': user2}))
Transaction sent: 0xfecbddfc28f3132c42a6f359a47b50tae26f3177c19a88c6c5adbce91e9
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 60000000 Nonce: 7
MaticX.setFeePercent confirmed Block: 14526571 Gas used: 28461 (0.00%)
Calling -> contract_MaticX.restakeAll({'from': user2}))
Transaction sent: 0
```

Code Location:

Listing	4:	MaticX.sol (Line 629)
624	func	<pre>stion setFeePercent(uint8 _feePercent)</pre>
625		external
626		override
627		onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
628	{	
629		
630	}	

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 5

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add the following require statement in the
setFeePercent() function.
require(_feePercent <= 100, "_feePercent must be <= 100");</pre>

Also consider limiting it to, for example, 10-20%. In this way, users will always be sure that their rewards will be reduced by a maximum of that amount.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Stader Labs team added the suggested require statement to the setFeePercent() function.

3.3 (HAL-03) UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

uint256 variables are already initialized to 0 by default. uint256 i = 0 would reassign the 0 to i which wastes gas.

Code Location:

MaticX.sol

- Line 252: uint256 currentIdx = 0;
- Line 311: for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < validators.length; idx++){
- Line 511: uint256 amountToClaim = 0;
- Line 709: for (uint256 i = 0; i < validators.length; i++){

ValidatorRegistry.sol

- Line 119: for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < validators.length - 1; idx++){

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended not to initialize uint256 variables to 0 to save gas.
For example, use instead: for (uint256 idx; idx < validators.length; ++
idx){.</pre>

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Stader Labs team acknowledged this finding.

3.4 (HAL-04) USING ++I CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN I++ IN LOOPS -INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the loop below, the variable i is incremented using i++. It is known that, in loops, using ++i costs less gas per iteration than i++.

Code Location:

```
MaticX.sol
```

```
- Line 253: for (; currentIdx < validators.length; currentIdx++){
- Line 311: for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < validators.length; idx++){
- Line 709: for (uint256 i = 0; i < validators.length; i++){</pre>
```

```
ValidatorRegistry.sol
```

```
- Line 119: for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < validators.length - 1; idx++){
```

Proof of Concept:

For example, based on the following test contract:

```
Listing 5: Test.sol
```

```
1 //SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity 0.8.9;
3
4 contract test {
5  function postiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
6  for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
7  }
8  }
9  function preiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
10  for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
11  }
12  }</pre>
```

```
>>> test_contract.postiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0xlecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limi: 6721975 Nonce: 44
test.postiincrement confirmed Block: 13622335 Gas used: 21620 (0.32%)

>>> test_contract.preiincrement(1)
Transaction '0xlecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b'>
>>> test_contract.preiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x205f09a4d2268de4c1a40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c71a022b047614a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limi: 6721975 Nonce: 45
test.prelincrement confirmed Block: 13622336 Gas used: 21593 (0.32%)

<pr
```

<Transaction '0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20elde05'>

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use ++i instead of i++ to increment the value of a uint variable within a loop. This does not just apply to the iterator variable. It also applies to increments made within the loop code block.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Stader Labs team now uses ++i in the for loops to increase the iterator variable, reducing the gas costs.

3.5 (HAL-05) PROPOSEDMANAGER STATE VARIABLE CAN BE REMOVED -INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the contract MaticX, the proposed_manager state variable is declared, but it is not used anywhere in the smart contract.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the proposed_manager state variable from the MaticX contract.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Stader Labs team removed the proposed_manager state variable.

3.6 (HAL-06) BOOLEAN EQUALITIES -INFORMATIONAL

Description:

Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

Code Location:

Listing	; 6:	ValidatorRegistry.sol (Line 262)
260 261	modi	fier whenValidatorIdExists(uint256 _validatorId) { require(
262		<pre>validatorIdExists[_validatorId] == true,</pre>
263		"Validator id doesn't exist in our registry"
264);
265		_;
266	}	

Listi	.ng 7:	ValidatorRegistry.sol (Line 277)
275 276	modi	fier whenValidatorIdDoesNotExist(uint256 _validatorId) { require(
		<pre>validatorIdExists[_validatorId] == false,</pre>
278		"Validator id already exists in our registry"
279);
280		_;
281	}	

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the equality to the boolean constant, for example:

```
Listing 8: ValidatorRegistry.sol (Line 262)

260 modifier whenValidatorIdExists(uint256 _validatorId) {

261 require(

262 validatorIdExists[_validatorId],

263 "Validator id doesn't exist in our registry"

264 );

265 _;

266 }
```

List	ting 9:	ValidatorRegistry.sol (Line 277)
275	mod	ifier whenValidatorIdDoesNotExist(uint256 _validatorId) {
276		require(
277		<pre>!validatorIdExists[_validatorId],</pre>
278		"Validator id already exists in our registry"
279);
280		_;
281	}	

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Stader Labs team acknowledged this finding.

4.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contract in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contract in the repository and was able to compile it correctly into its abi and binary format, Slither was run against the contract. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:



Reentran	y in Match.ProvideinstantPoolmatic(Uintzo6) (Contracts/match.sol#93-99): Provideonales
	IERCODypressebile(token).setSTansforTrom(may sender, address(this), amount) (contracts/MaticX.sol#40) Iace variables wittin after the oil(s):
	<pre>instant_pool_matic + instant_pool_matic + amount (contracts/MaticX.solif#8) y in MaticX.group/delamater/Double(contracts/MaticX.solif#0-107);</pre>
	zernal ouls: IRX200prasable(eddress(this)),safeTransferfrom(mag.sender,eddress(this),_manount) (contracts/MaticX.solf)04)
Reentran	A ANY PERSONAL PALLED AND ALLED AND ALLE
	frerai calls: = ellVouche_rev(validatocthare,emount2#ithdravfromValidator,type() (uint256).max) (contracts/MaticX.solf240-244)
	- TVAlidatorShare(validatorShare) sellYoucher pav (_disAdouxn, paximusShareaToUxn) (concrete/MaidatorShare) Let variable v virtem AGT the coll(p) Let variable v virtem AGT the coll(p)
Reentran	users (intrastant performance) (intrastant and intrastant and intr
	<pre>tEPc3Opprodeble(ckos).sdftrandsfrom(may_snder_address(thin), anount) (contracts/MatixX, solH31)) tEPc3Opprodeble(ckdoss(thin)).sdftrandsfrom(may_snder_address(thin), anount) [CRC3Opprodeble(ckddss(thin)).sdftrandsfrom(may_snder_address(thin))] [CRC3Opprodeble(ckddss(thin)).sdftrandsfrom(may_snder_address(thin))] </pre>
	<pre>tate veriables written after the call(p): instant_poil_matic = instant_poil_matic = , anount (contracts/MaticX.sol#143)</pre>
	: http://github.com/crysic/slither/wik/Detector-DocumentationFreentramy-vulnerabilities-2
Reentran	y in Mariok_classWithdrewal(address_unit260) (contracts/Mariok_sol425-112); astroni cali: marinal cali: de antimatematri (de) unitarzebitase aradiomatri (de) unitarzebitant (der twi coldidad27)
	- TVilidatorDaret, validatorDaret, markeClasTotems med (mbonNEMec) (contexts/Matick.soli#34) IEECOOPpradmable(toke), markeTianafet (p. annutTollam) (contexts/Matick.soli#34)
	Vent emitted after the old/second field (second field (sec
Reentran	y in MaioX.drfain[uin1256] (contracts/MaioX.aol#325-349): Xiternal calls:
	sellYouther new(validatorBhare, validatorBhalmot, trype () (uint256) max) (contracts/MatiCX, sol338) - TValidatorBhare(validatorBhare), estilamBonut_gammaMharesOpun) (contracts/MatiCX, sol4149-422)
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Parameter ValidatorRegistry.addValidator(uint256), validatorId (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol#62) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ValidatorRegistry.removeValidator(uint256), validatorId (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol#90) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ValidatorRegistry.setPreferredDepositValidatorId(uint256), validatorId (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol#130) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ValidatorRegistry.setPreferredWithdrawalValidatorId(uin256), validatorId (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol\$199) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ValidatorRegistry.setMaticX(address). maticX(contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol#157) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ValidatorRegistry.setVersion(string), version (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol\$167) is not in mixedCase
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Parameter IMaticX.initialize(address.address.address.address.address.address), instant pool manager (contracts/interfaces/IMaticX.sol#41) is not in mixedCase
Function IValidatorShare.sellVoucher new(uint256) uint256) (contracts/interfaces/IValidatorShare.solf22-23) is not in mixedCase
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Function IValidatorShare.unbonds new(address.uint256) (contracts/interfaces/IValidatorShare.sol#36-39) is not in mixedCase
AccessControlUpgradeable. gap (node modules/@openreppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol#238) is never used in ValidatorRegistry (contracts/ValidatorRegistry.sol
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationfunused-state-wariable
grantRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessControlUpgradeable.grantRole(bytes32,address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol#136-138)
revokeRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessControlUpgradeable.revokeRole(bytes32,address) (node modules/§openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol\$149-151)
and the second

FxStateChildTunnel.sol

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
Different versions of Solidity is used:
- Version used: ['^0.8.0', '^0.8.7']
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERCl65.sol#4)
- ^0.8.7 (contracts/state-transfer/FxStateChildTunnel.sol#2)
- ^0.8.0 (contracts/tunnel/FxBaseChildTunnel.sol#2)
Reference: https://github.ccm/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
AccessControl. setRoleAdmin(bytes32, bytes32) (/maticxnew/node_modules/Sopenzeppelin/contracts/access/Acces
FxBaseChildTunnelprocessMessageFromRoot(uint256,address,bytes) (contracts/tunnel/FxBaseChildTunnel.sol#72-76) is never used and should be removed
FxBaseChildTunnelsendMessageToRoot(bytes) (contracts/tunnel/FxBaseChildTunnel.sol#59-61) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toHexString(uint256) (/maticxnew/node_modules/%openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#40-51) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toString(uint256) (/maticxnew/node_modules/&openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#15-35) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
Pragma version^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node modules/Ropenzeppelin/contracts/access/accessControl.sol#4) allows old versions
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Pragma version^0.8.0 (./maticxnew/node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol\$4) allows old versions
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Pragma version^0.8.0 (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/tunnel/FxBaseChildTunnel.sol#2) allows old versions
solc-0.8.9 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Parameter FxStateChildTunnel.setFxRootTunnel(address)fxRootTunnel (contracts/state-transfer/FxStateChildTunnel.sol#20) is not in mixedCase
grantRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
 AccessControl.grantRole(bytes32,address) (/maticxnew/node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#130-132)
- AccessControl.revokeRole(bytes32,address) (/maticxnew/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#143-145)
 AccessControl.renounceRole(bytes32,address) (/maticxnew/node_modules/%openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#161-165)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation/public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

FxStateRootTunnel.sol

- maticx = maticx (contracts/state-transfer/fxStateRootTunnel.sol#22)
fxStateRootTunnel.setNstLCX(address).matiCX (contracts/state-transfer/FxStateRootTunnel.sol#34) lacks a zero-check on :
- metalmetal (contracts/scate-transfer/scate-transfer/state-transfer/stateRootTunnel.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on :
- fxChildTunnel = fxChildTunnel (contracts/state-transfer/FxStateRootTunnel.sol\$93)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing=zero-address-validation
ExitPayloadReader.copy(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/lib/ExitPayloadReader.sol#31-55) uses assembly
- INLINE ASK (contracts/lib/sitPayloadReader.sol#40-42)
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/ExitPayloadReader.sol#50-54)
<pre>ExitPayloadReader.getReceipt(ExitPayloadReader.ExitPayload) (contracts/lib/ExitPayloadReader.sol#115-143) uses assembly WiWE Nov (contracts/lib/ExitPayloadReader.ExitPayloadReader.sol#115-143)</pre>
<pre>teckle.dc/Membership(bytes32,uint256, bytes32, bytes32, bytes3)</pre>
RLPReader.toRipItem(bytes) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#52-63) uses assembly
- InLie Ast (Collide(5/11)/REFREAUE-501455-00)
 INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/RLFReader.sol#125-127)
RLPReader.slpBytesKeccak256(RLPReader.RLPItem) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#137-149) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#145-147) ElBeader neulos/Kacaszific/ElBeader ElFizes/(contracts/lib/ElBeader sol#165-177) uses assembly:
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lb/kLPreder.slr/cm)
RLPReader.toRlpBytes(RLPReader.RLPItem) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#182-197) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/RLFReader.sol#191-193)
Aupreader: tobooreantkupreader.aufild/BLPReader.aoi#200-209) uses assembly - TVLTRF SM (Contracted) 10 (BLPReader.aoi#240-206)
RLPReader.toUint(RLPReader.RLPItem) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#218-236) uses assembly
RLPReader.toUintStrict(RLPReader.RLPIcem) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#239-250) uses assembly
 INLING ASK [CONTRACTS/IID/KLPRERGE:S014/40-24/] PERADE: ISUERS(E): FDFTem [CONTRACTS/II/SEPRADE: 5014252-256) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/RLFReader.sol#260-262)
RLPReaderitemLength(uint256) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#288-319) uses assembly
 INLINE ASM [contracts/lib/REPReader.s01#291-293] TUTUE SW [contracts/lib/REPreader.s01#296-205]
 INLINE ASM (CONTRACT/ALD/IN/REPORT - 30/12/97-303) INLINE ASM (CONTRACT/ALD/IN/REPORT - 30/12/97-305)
RLPReaderpayloadOffset(uint256) (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#322-337) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/RLPReader.sol#324-326)
<pre>kLrkeader.copy(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/iib/kLrkeader.soi#344-3/1) uses assembly</pre>
- INLINE ASM (contracts/lib/PLDDeader sol#353-355)
- INLINE ASN (contracts/lib/REReader.sol435-355) - INLINE ASN (contracts/lib/REReader.sol4366-370)
- INLINE ABM (contracts/lb/RLF84eder.asl355)-335) - INLINE ABM (contracts/lb/RLF84eder.asl3166-370) Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#asmembly-usage
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<pre>pantBill (pyres1, ddness mould be deltered exerce):</pre>

- No major issues found by Slither.
- The reentrancies flagged by Slither were checked individually and they are false positives.

4.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on the contract and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

MythX results:

MaticX.sol

Report for contracts/MaticX.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/632e97ac-b13d-45ce-93cd-3ea10d836d90

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
17	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
467	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
525	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

ValidatorRegistry.sol

No issues found by MythX.

FxStateChildTunnel.sol

Report for contracts/state-transfer/FxStateChildTunnel.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/553dc8da-909c-44fl-b7e3-ff9a2f5eeb78

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

FxStateRootTunnel.sol

Report for contracts/state-transfer/FxStateRootTunnel.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/4bdaa7c5-b8a7-420b-bbb9-de62a31c3355

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

RateProvider.sol Report for contracts/state-transfer/RateProvider.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/ced64c4f-6079-4349-bc81-4ad0d14b8ff6

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
22	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

• No major issues found by MythX. The requirement violations are all false positives.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING